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This Answer is submitted pursuant to Rule 35 R. Utah S. 
Ct. by Appellants, Banberry Development Corporation, Banberry 
Crossing (collectively "Banberry") and Sidney M. Horman 
( "Horman" ) in opposition to the January 30, 1990 petition for 
rehearing of respondent Eugene L. Kimball ("Kimball") from this 
Court's opinion of January 2, 1990. 
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF POSITION 
Kimball's Petition for Rehearing of the January 2, 1990 
Opinion consists of two arguments. The first is that this Court 
did not delineate in its opinion all of the factual claims which 
Kimball believes are important to a resolution of the fraud 
issue on appeal. In advancing such argument, Kimball makes no 
showing that this Court "overlooked or misapprehended"1 the 
extended factual arguments made by Kimball in the appeal. The 
fact that the Courtf s opinion does not track down and respond to 
each one. of Kimball's "badges of fraud" arguments does not at 
all suggest, much less warrant, the conclusion that the argument 
was overlooked or misapprehended. 
Kimball's fraud arguments in his Petition are merely 
repetition of the same arguments made in the main appeal. 
Duplicative arguments already once rejected or determined to be 
inapposite by the Court are not the proper basis of a rehearing 
petition under the controlling precedent. 
1
 Rule 35(a) of this Court's rules requires that a petition for rehearing state 
with particularity the points of law or fact which it is claimed "the court has 
overlooked or misapprehended**." 
Secondly, Kimball presents for the first time the 
question of Horman?s and Banberry's standing to raise the 
"payment" issue on appeal. Contrary to Kimball's position, 
Horman and Banberry do have interests that were adversely 
impacted by the "payment" verdict and judgment and both have 
requisite standing to appeal. Beyond that, Kimball has at-
tempted to raise the "payment" issue for the first time on 
rehearing after having already taken his position and submitted 
expansive argument on the merits of the "payment question" in 
the main appeal. Having lost that position and argument under 
the Court's opinion, Kimball now urges that there was no 
standing or jurisdiction to raise the issue on appeal in the 
first instance. This Court has not looked with favor on such 
practice or strategy. 
Kimball's Petition for Rehearing is unsupported in law 
and should be rejected. 
POINT I. 
CONTRARY TO KIMBALL'S PETITION, THE FACTS 
MATERIAL TO THE RATIONALE OF THE COURT'S OPINION 
WERE NOT OMITTED. 
Kimball begins his argument on the erroneous note that 
in a case of significant factual complexity, the Court's Opinion 
spends only one and 1/2 half pages outlining the facts. 
(Kimball Pet. p. 2.) Kimball argues from this that his "badges 
of fraud" argument was not given appropriate weight by the Court 
and that a rehearing should be granted to allow consideration of 
such matters and corresponding amendment to the Court's Opinion. 
2 
To begin with, the Court's recital and analysis of the 
facts in its Opinion surrounding the fraud issue are not 
confined to one and 1/2 pages as alleged by Kimball. Although 
it would be no diatribe if the allegation were correct, it is 
not correct. The Court's factual analysis runs throughout the 
first 17 pages of the slip Opinion and is found particularly on 
pages 2-3, 10-13 and 17-18. Kimball's so-called "badges of 
fraud" are discussed generally although not, perhaps, with the 
glowing tilt and the detailed labels of Kimball's argument.2 
Secondly, this Court is not required to recite each and every 
factual claim or argument raised in an appeal. State v. Carter, 
776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) ("This Court need not analyze and 
address in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim 
raised and properly before us on appeal.") (Opinion by Hall, 
C.J.); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Arizona Indus. Comm'n., 90 Ariz. 
379, 368 P.2d 450 (1962); Grand Lodge, Etc. v. Hermoine Lodge 
No. 16, Etc., 258 Ala. 641, 64 So. 2d 405 (1952) (appellate 
court not required to reproduce all of the trial evidence in its 
opinion where record is voluminous). The judicial task would be 
endless if that were the case. Rather, it is sufficient if the 
Court has given reasonable consideration to the facts surround-
ing the issues which the Court determines will govern the 
appeal. Carter, 776 P.2d at 888-89; Phelps, 368 P.2d at 451. 
January 2, 1990 Slip Opinion, pp. 4-6; 13-14. 
3 
In its January 2 Opinion, this Court at the threshold 
focused on what it determined to be the "dispositive issue on 
appeal" relative to Kimball's fraud claim. Slip Op. at 3. That 
issue was clearly defined as one of duty -- viz. , whether a duty 
existed on the part of Herman, Banberry, First Security Bank and 
the Horman Trust to disclose to Kimball the existence and 
contents of their settlement and purchase agreement. The Court 
thereupon undertook a penetrating analysis of the legal duty to 
disclose facts not only as between senior and junior lien-
holders, but also in the specific context of the facts before 
the Court. 
The Court reached the conclusion that there was no 
special, confidential, or fiduciary duty as between Horman, the 
Bank or Banberry and Kimball that would have imposed a legal 
duty of disclosure. The Court's conclusion was reached in full 
light of the evidence and the extenuated argument of the 
parties. No single piece of evidence cited by the Court in its 
Opinion is alleged by Kimball to be inaccurate or unfounded. 
Kimball's argument comes down to no more than a desire to 
rewrite the Court's opinion so as to specifically keynote its 
exaggerated badges of fraud argument, without the slightest 
showing that the Court failed to consider those claims in its 
analysis of the "duty" issue. The Court's Opinion set out a 
concise but substantial exposition of the relevant, objective 
facts that were reasonably required for the resolution of the 
4 
duty issue. The nature and development of the Opinion is 
fundamentally a matter of discretion for the Court. 
Part of the difficulty of Kimball's petition is that it 
does not demonstrate how the end result in this appeal would 
change if this Court were to somehow rewrite its Opinion to 
Kimball's desire. Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power Co., 82 
Utah 622, 26 P. 2d 822 (1933). Since the Court found that 
resolution of the duty issue was dispositive of the appeal, Slip 
Op. at 3, 13, 16, the Court found it unnecessary to address the 
other elements of fraud which equally plagued Kimball's position 
herein. Kimball was faced with the obstacles of demonstrating 
the nature of the false misrepresentation of fact, reliance by 
Kimball, and damages, as well as how the fraud verdict could 
stand against Horman and Banberry without a wholesale rewriting 
of Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1953). Lastly, 
the factual hypothesis in Kimball's petition, p. 8, that the 
subject settlement agreement expressly provided that it would be 
kept secret until Kimball lost his lien, is, at minimum, a vast 
hyperbole unsupported in the factual record. 
These obstacles cannot be overcome or the exaggerated 
assumptions sustained in Kimball's petition for rehearing. It 
should be denied. 
5 
POINT II. 
HORMAN AND BANBERRY HAD STANDING TO RAISE 
THE PAYMENT ISSUE ON APPEAL AND KIMBALL IS 
JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED FROM ARGUING OTHERWISE. 
The second point in Kimball's Petition is that Horman 
and/or Banberry lacked standing to appeal the verdict and 
judgment on "payment" of the Bank's senior lien. Lack of 
standing, it is argued, deprives this Court of the power to hear 
or decide the issue of payment and thus, the petition argues 
that a significant portion of the Court's Opinion which addres-
ses the "payment" issue and finds reversible error in the trial 
court judgment should be reheard and set aside. 
This is a new argument for Kimball, never before 
advanced. It is not only new as to the trial court proceedings, 
it is new in the main appeal of this case. Indeed, Kimball has 
consistently presented argument to the trial court and to this 
Court that assumed, by definition, full standing of Horman and 
Banberry to raise and argue the "payment" question. 
Throughout his main brief on appeal, Kimball blithely 
and continually refers to Horman and not the Horman Trust as the 
party who was bound by the "payment" verdict and judgment.3 
Typical of those statements are the following: 
. . . When payment was discovered, First Security 
and Sidney Horman denied it, as they do to this 
day. They refused to reconvey the First Security 
trust deeds . . . They clouded Kimball's lien 
3
 Kimball July 22, 1988 Brief, pp. 2, 4-5, 9, 12, 23-29, 31-34, 36, 44, 51-54, 
60-61, 73-74, 77, 79, 83-84, 87-91, 93. 
6 
from 1984 to 1987 and enjoined him from foreclos-
ing . . . 
"Hormanfs paying the First Security loans 
in secret while arranging to have the Bank remain 
in title to the liens and appear to foreclose its 
loan . . . was a fraud on Kimball." 
Kimball Resp. Br. pp. 4, 5. 
1. Standing of Horman to Raise the Payment Question is 
Clear. The legal principle of standing is well recognized in 
the case precedent of this Court. Society of Professional 
Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987); Terracor v. 
Utah Board of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986). Standing 
does not turn upon abstract or academic argument, Society of 
Professional Journalists, 743 P.2d at 1174, but will be viewed 
within the reality of facts as to the specific interest and 
impact that the judgment will have upon the individual's inter-
est. Terracor, 716 P. 2d at 799. The underlying legal policy is 
thus stated by this Court: 
"The doctrine of standing is intended to assure 
the procedural integrity of judicial adjudication 
by requiring that parties to a lawsuit have a 
sufficient interest in the subject matter of the 
dispute and sufficient adverseness that the legal 
and factual issues which must be resolved must be 
thoroughly explored." 
Id. at 798. 
Kimball is in error in arguing that the "payment" verdict 
and judgment in the trial court had no adverse impact upon 
Sidney M. Horman. In law, Horman had standing to appeal the 
payment verdict to this Court for a number of reasons. To begin 
with, Horman was directly and adversely affected by the "pay-
7 
ment" judgment, because the finding of payment was absolutely 
essential to Kimball's fraud claim against Horman. Kimball's 
alleged claim of fraudulent concealment was premised on the 
argument that the Bank's liens were extinguished by the un-
disclosed "payment" agreement. Horman thus had standing to 
appeal the fraud verdict and to challenge the underlying payment 
verdict. 
Moreover, the transaction between the Bank and the Horman 
Trust, through Sidney Horman as trustee, was part of a larger 
settlement agreement involving other properties in which Horman 
and the Banberry interests were involved. The "payment" verdict 
and judgment had an impact upon the larger settlement agreement 
that would be binding upon both Horman and the Banberry inter-
ests. 
Furthermore, Horman was sued, appeared and defended in 
the case on the question of "payment." He was alleged to be the 
alter-ego of the Trust and Banberry and the Trust was impacted 
to that extent. Horman was seriously prejudiced by the payment 
verdict, for if allowed to stand, it meant that the Horman Trust 
would have delivered $1,600,000 to the Bank for the purchase of 
the Bank's senior lien rights, without receiving any considera-
tion therefor. 
Additionally, Horman was significantly prejudiced by the 
"payment" verdict for purposes of res judicata. If the "pay-
ment" judgment had not been reversed by this Court for prejudi-
cial error in the instructions to the jury, there is little 
8 
doubt that Kimball would have taken the position that said 
verdict and judgment would be res judicata to Horman in his 
individual, as well as his fiduciary, capacity as trustee for 
the Horman Trust. Therefore, the Trust may be bound by the 
payment verdict because the trustee was before the trial court 
and defended against Kimball's "payment" claim.4 
Both Banberry and Horman had standing to appeal the 
"payment" verdict and judgment because of the First Jury Verdict 
which this Court, on appeal, found to be prejudicial and rever-
sible error. Interrogatory No. 4 of the First Special Verdict 
questioned the jury as to whether "the transfer of $1.6 million 
to First Security Bank and First Security Financial constituted 
a 'payment' from Banberry Crossing to First Security Bank and 
FSF of the trust deed notes?" (Emphasis added.) (See Attach-
ment 1. ) 
This Court, in its January 2, 1990 Opinion at p. 21, 
found that special verdict to be prejudicial error, because even 
if there were a "payment" rather than "purchase" of the trust 
deed notes, the payment under all of the evidence did not come 
from Banberry. See Slip Op. at 21. Clearly, Banberry had 
standing to appeal the special verdict on "payment" against 
4
 Provident Tradesmens B. & T. Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968) 
(Appellate Court should protect an absent party whose interest may be affected by 
a judgment that as a practical matter impairs or impedes its ability to protect its 
interest); Hendrick v. Mitchell, 320 Mass. 155, 69 N.E.2d 466 (1946) (Trustee had 
standing to appeal an order advantageous to a trust where it exposed trustee to 
potential liability). 
9 
which it had defended and lost. Horman was the "common factor" 
between Banberry and the Trust and he, as well, was prejudicial-
ly impacted and had standing to appeal the First Jury Verdict on 
"payment". 
Lastly, both Horman and Banberry had standing to appeal 
the payment verdict because of its prejudicial impact upon the 
subsequent fraud instructions, Instruction No. 19 in particular. 
In the Second Jury Verdict and at Kimball's request, the trial 
court charged the jury that for the purpose of determining the 
culpability of Horman and Banberry for the alleged fraud, the 
October 1984 agreements were between the Bank, Banberry, Sidney 
Horman and others. The very integration of the "payment" 
verdict as part of the "fraud" verdict against Sidney M. Horman 
and Banberry provided more than the requisite standing in which 
to appeal the "payment" verdict and judgment. 
The public policy underlying the standing principle is 
fully served by the appeal on the "payment" verdict and judg-
ment. If this Court's opinion on the "payment" verdict were 
now reversed on rehearing, First Security could not perform 
under its settlement agreement with the Banberry parties and the 
Trust. The Trust could be irreparably damaged and Horman 
exposed to potential liability as trustee. On this point, 
alone, Horman has standing under the precedent of Terracor to 
challenge the "payment" verdict and judgment. 
2. Kimball's Claim as to Standing on Rehearing is the 
Categorical Antithesis of His Argument Below and in the Main 
10 
Appeal. In making his argument on standing, Kimball was aware 
of the ruling case law of this Court that new issues may not be 
raised for the first time on rehearing. As Justice Oaks wrote 
for a unanimous Court in Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678, 
681 (Utah 1982): 
"A losing party cannot use a petition for rehear-
ing 'to present to this court a new theory or 
contention which was neither in the record as it 
was before this court, nor in the arguments 
made f". (Citing authority. ) 
Kimball acknowledges the lateness of his argument but 
apologetically urges that this is an "exceptional circumstance," 
citing Jollivet v. Cook.5 The only "exceptional circumstance" 
involving the standing question is that it is first raised in a 
rehearing petition of an appeal in which the party had taken the 
opposite position, argued and lost the appealed issue. The 
essence of Kimball's proposition is simple. It is that he may 
make an elaborate argument on the substantive merits of the 
"payment" question in the main appeal, lose on that question and 
then turn around on rehearing and argue for the first time that 
there was no standing to address the "payment" issue and argu-
ment in the first place. 
Kimball spent nearly 40 pages of his main brief on appeal 
on the "payment" question, urging that Horman as the alter-ego 
of Banberry, used the Horman Trust as a "straw man," or a 
"dummy," or as his alter-ego in making the alleged "payment" to 
784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 751 (1990). 
11 
the Bank discharging the latterfs senior liens. During the 
trial before the lower court, in resisting a motion bT^ the 
defendants that Kimball had failed to join the Horman Trust as 
an indispensable party, Kimball resisted, arguing that it was 
sufficient for the trial court's jurisdiction on the question of 
"payment" that Horman was before the Court as the alter-ego of 
the Trust and Banberry.6 
How is it that Kimball is able to make such a vigorous 
argument on the merits of the "payment" issue on appeal herein 
and then having lost thereon, now urges on rehearing the lack of 
legal standing to make the argument? If Kimball had prevailed 
before this Court on the "payment" question, would he be here on 
rehearing urging the Court to set aside and vacate its opinion 
for lack of standing? 
It is to preclude a party from engaging in such inconsis-
tent conduct that the doctrine of judicial estoppel has been 
recognized before this Court. As Justice Crockett put it in his 
concurrence on a denial of a petition for rehearing: 
11
. . . it is totally foreign to my conception of 
fairness and justice for a party to submit his 
controversy to a court for adjudication, then 
wait to see whether he wins or loses, and when he 
loses to then attack the composition of the 
court. That this may not properly be done, see 
. . . citing authorities . . . " 
Shippers Best Express, Inc. v. Newsome, 579 P.2d 1316 (Utah 
1978). 
R. 4948, Argument of Kimball's counsel at May 14, 1986 hearing, Tr. 8-11. 
12 
Justice Maughan of this Court expressed the policy behind 
judicial estoppel -- "the prevention of toying with judicial 
process." He stated: 
For my view, such toying occurs when a litigant 
is allowed success while maintaining inconsistent 
positions. 
The maxim ? one cannot blow hot and cold in the 
same breath' finds its expression in the doctrine 
of judicial estoppel. A litigant is not allowed 
to maintain inconsistent positions in judicial 
proceedings. 
Royal Resources v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 797 (Utah 
1979) (Maughan, J., dissenting). 
Kimball filed his main brief in this case subject to the 
sanctions of Rule 11 as incorporated in Supreme Court Rule 40(a) 
acknowledging that the "payment" argument had the requisite 
standing. He is now estopped from arguing a contrary position 
for the first time in a petition for rehearing as to an issue 
which was lost in the main appeal. 
Kimball's argument on standing cannot be saved by the 
Court exercising its authority, sua sponte, to review the 
question of standing. As has been demonstrated above, both 
Horman and Banberry were adversely impacted by the "payment" 
verdict in a number of ways and both had standing to bring that 
issue before this Court on appeal. Kimball's argument on 
standing is fraught with difficulty and should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
Kimball's petition for rehearing, apart from the issue 
of standing, is a reargument of issues that have already been 
13 
fully evaluated and resolved by the Court's opinion of January 
2, 1990. Kimball does not make out even the most marginal 
argument that this Court has overlooked or misinterpreted 
critical and relevant facts to the issues which it found were 
dispositive of the appeal. Kimball's argument on standing is 
abortive for several reasons and should be rejected. 
The petition for rehearing should be denied in all 
respects, it is 
Respectfully submitted, 
February 27, 1990 
ROBERT S. C'AtoPBSWf JR. <£/ 
L 
E. BARNEY GESJ 
of and for 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Sidney M. Horman and 
the Banberry Parties 
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Attachment 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD- JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF 
UTAH, N.A., and FIRST 
SECURITY FINANCIAL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BANBERRY CROSSING, EUGENE R. 
KIMBALL, et al., 
Defendants. 
EUGENE L. KIMBALL, 
Cross-Claimant, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, DON 
HUTCHISON and COMMONWEALTH 
LAND TITLE COMPANY, 
Cross-Defendants. 
We, the jury, find the following answers to the questions 
propounded to us in accordance with the Court's instructions: 
1. Did Summit County Title comply with the instructions 
of Kimball in the May 8, 1981 (Exhibit t3°f\ ) and July 8, 1981 
(Exhibit #4«c>8) letters? 
Yes Ho X 
FIRST SPECIAL VERDICT 
CIVIL NO. 7457 
No. 
F I L E D 
MY 21 1903 
CJ#ri of Summit Cowa+y 
IY....W 
bVpu '^cM 
2 
(a) If you have answered question No. 1 "no," please 
answer this question: 
Did Eugene L. Kimball release Summit County Title 
Company from performance of the instructiort? 
AhtL 2* Was s*dn*y M* Hornan the alter ego of Banberry Crossing 
or Banberry Development Corp. when the Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 
#K>t6 ) was made in October of 1984? 
Yee X No 
3. Was Sidney M. Horman the alter ego of the Horman Family 
Trust when the Purchase Agreement (Exhibit # |o^8 ) was made 
in October of 1984? 
Yes No X 
4. In l i g h t of the Court's instruct ion relating to the 
Purchase Agreement (Exhibit # iots ) and "payment" heretofore 
given to you, did the transfer of $1.6 mill ion to First Security 
Bank and F i r s t Securi ty Financial constitute a "payment" from 
Banberry Crossing to F i r s t Security Bank and F i r s t Security 
Financial of the trust deed notes? 
Yes_iC- No 
Dated this }C dav of May, 1986. 
FOREPERSON 
